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ABOUT THE PROJECT
Begun in late 2012, this two-year project will explore and promote the ways that Canada and Australia 
can enhance their security cooperation and contribute to more stable regional security environments and 
governance mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region.
The region has become an increasingly important area for the Canadian government’s international economic 
priorities. Regional security and stability are prerequisites to achieving these priorities, and given Australia’s 
tremendous success engaging with Asia-Pacific countries from trade and investment through to security, 
there is no better partner for Canada’s own broader engagement in the region.
The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
(ASPI) will explore the possibilities for Canadian and Australian cooperation in promoting strengthened 
security and regional governance in the Asia-Pacific. It will cover areas such as strategic policy, cooperation in 
foreign policy and defence initiatives, and closer military-to-military ties. The project will be led by Australian 
and Canadian co-chairs, advised by a binational council of prominent individuals and officials. The project’s 
research will contribute to discussions at the February 2014 Australia-Canada Economic Leadership Forum in 
Melbourne. The resulting report will be presented later in 2014 to both Australian and Canadian governments.
As an additional element, CIGI is working closely with two Korean partners — the Seoul Forum for 
International Affairs and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies — which will host one of the two regional 
workshops that form part of the project. It is expected that this workshop will also give important insights 
into the possibilities of Korean engagement with Canada and Australia in ongoing cooperation in the security 
domain.
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PREFACE
This report has been prepared for delivery at the 2014 Australia-Canada Economic Leadership Forum in Melbourne, 
Australia. The forum is a summit of private- and public-sector leaders from both countries that meets every two 
years. The goal of the forum is to foster high-level and frank exchanges on issues and challenges of mutual interest 
to Australia and Canada — partners and allies who share common historical roots and values, including respect for 
freedom and the rule of law, and the advancement of international peace and security.
The report is the product of a highly successful partnership between ASPI and CIGI, with added support from the 
Asan Institute for Policy Studies and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs.
It was prepared under the direction of two co-chairs, Leonard Edwards, distinguished fellow at CIGI and Canada’s 
former deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Peter Jennings, executive director of ASPI and former deputy secretary 
for strategy in the Australian Department of Defence.
The report was drafted by John Blaxland, a senior fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at Australian 
National University, and James Manicom, CIGI research fellow in the Global Security Program, under the guidance of 
the two co-chairs. CIGI and ASPI are extremely grateful for their hard work in putting this report together.
The recommendations in this report are heavily influenced by two meetings, held in Singapore on June 2-3, 2013 and 
in Seoul on October 18-19, 2013. CIGI and ASPI thank all of the participants who attended those meetings, including 
Rajesh Basrur, Eva Busza, Andrew Carr, Cho Chang-beom, Graeme Dobell, Leif-Eric Easley, Paul Evans, Tobias 
Feakin, Roger Girouard, Han Feng, Tim Huxley, Jo Dong-Joon, Jung Ku Hyun, Kim Young Ho, Lee Jae-Sung, Lee 
Shin-wha, Iishi Masafumi, Elina Noor, Raymund Quilop, Liu Qun, Mark Raymond, Sakong Il, See Seng Tan, Sheen 
Seongho, Russell Trood, Ouyang Wei, Jung-yup Woo, Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Samina Yasmeen. The report has also 
benefitted greatly from detailed written comments and ideas offered by Tom d’Aquino, Perrin Beatty, Don Campbell, 
Wendy Dobson, Brian Job, James Judd, Pierre Lortie, Reid Morden, Alain Pellerin, Michael Small, David Welch and 
Yuen Pau Woo.
For their special contributions and support, CIGI and ASPI would like to thank Tanya Ogilvie-White, Sarah Norgrove, 
Hayley Channer and Janice Johnson from ASPI; Hahm Chaibong, Choi Kang, Jaehyon Lee and Haeri Joo from the 
Asan Institute for Policy Studies; Ambassador Yim Sung-joon from the Seoul Forum for International Affairs; and 
David Dewitt and Carol Bonnett from CIGI. CIGI Research Associate Simon Palamar also prepared some of the figures 
and charts contained in the report.
Fen Osler Hampson, FRSC 
Distinguished Fellow and  
Director of the Global Security Program, CIGI 
January 2014
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Canada and Australia have shared interests in bolstering 
economic prosperity and security cooperation across 
East Asia.1 The focus of the world economy has shifted to 
Asia; Canada should follow the path Australia has taken 
for decades and orient itself — in economic and security 
terms — toward the emerging economies of East Asia. 
The risk of regional instability is growing, however, 
due to China’s re-emergence, continued speculation 
about US strategic engagement in Asia and increased 
competition over disputed maritime boundaries. These 
developments provide opportunities for collaboration 
between countries like Canada and Australia. Non-
traditional security threats, including natural disasters, 
climate change, food security and cyber security, point to 
a range of areas where the two countries can work more 
closely together.
Economics and security are indelibly linked in East 
Asia. Relations among the Northeast Asian states are 
marred by profound strategic and political mistrust. In 
Asia as a whole, there is an absence of strong regional 
institutions to help manage or mitigate crises. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the 
pivotal institution around which other forums revolve. 
These are, in turn, the lynchpin of regional security and 
economic discourse. Progress on substantive issues 
can appear glacial, but participation in these forums 
is widely seen as the prerequisite for influence. Close 
engagement with ASEAN is essential for countries 
interested in contributing to regional security, which is, 
in turn, a precondition for improved trade relations with 
the dynamic East Asian economies.
The alignment of politically like-minded prime 
ministers in Ottawa and Canberra provides scope for 
creative consideration of how the two countries can 
help bolster regional security and stability as well as 
economic prosperity by working more closely together. 
Given its deeper integration in the region, Australia 
may also provide pointers to facilitate Canada’s greater 
engagement, but Canada must also engage directly with 
the region. 
Direct bilateral engagement between Canada and 
Australia should cover the following four areas: 
strengthening regional security; bolstering regional 
governance mechanisms; enhancing bilateral defence 
and security cooperation; and boosting industrial and 
economic cooperation.
This paper calls for policy makers and business leaders 
in Canada and Australia to consider the broader and 
longer-term benefits of greater bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation in East Asia. With resource constraints in 
mind, the following initiatives are recommended:
1 The region is referred to as “East Asia” for the sake of convention. 
The case for a redefinition of the region as “Indo-Pacific” is made in 
Medcalf (2012).
• Strengthen regional security. Canada and 
Australia must align their separate defence and 
security engagement activities in East Asia, share 
lessons learned and look for ways to maximize 
their separate and collective impact in cooperating 
with regional friends.
• Bolster regional governance mechanisms. 
Canada and Australia must work to strengthen 
regional capabilities in ways that add to stability, 
in particular, in the areas of peacekeeping skills, 
counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, disaster 
relief and cyber resilience. They can also work with 
others to make regional security governance more 
effective.
• Enhance bilateral defence and security 
cooperation. Canada and Australia must deepen 
their individual defence and security dialogues and 
look for cost-effective ways to do more together 
across a broad sweep of areas from exercises to 
defence reform planning.
• Boost defence industry and economic cooperation. 
Canada and Australia should find ways to align 
defence procurement plans to find cost savings and 
share best practices on equipment procurement. 
Their reputation as reliable suppliers of freely 
traded agricultural and energy products should 
also be strengthened.
INTRODUCTION
Canada and Australia face critical challenges to their 
future prosperity. Both confront growing uncertainties 
conditioned by global economic rebalancing by the rise 
of emerging economies. Although the new engines of 
global growth — in Asia, primarily — are not as steady as 
once thought, governments in both Ottawa and Canberra 
have been clear that the future prosperity of their 
countries rests in East Asia. Reforms announced at the 
third plenum of the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP’s) Central Committee suggest 
that Chinese leaders understand the huge challenges 
involved in rebalancing China’s economy towards a more 
sustainable growth model. The US preoccupation with 
pursing a wide-ranging “high quality” trade agreement 
with Asian economies requires Canada and Australia to 
take heed in light of their own trade ties with the United 
States. These economic prerogatives are set against an 
increasingly insecure regional setting in which deeply 
integrated production networks co-exist with active 
territorial disputes, historical animosity and rising 
military spending. This is the economic and strategic 
context in which ASPI and CIGI convened meetings 
in East Asia to discuss the trajectory of the Canada-
Australia security relationship (see Boxes 2 and 3).2 
2 This report draws on two regional meetings that featured scholars 
and practitioners from Australia, Canada and across East Asia, and 
on background papers commissioned for this exercise, which were 
published by ASPI and CIGI in 2013.
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This report provides a road map for security and 
defence cooperation between two countries with 
similar economies, shared democratic values and 
complementary strategic perspectives.
Australia and Canada are free-market, liberal Western 
democracies with parallel historical experiences and 
very similar cultural predispositions deriving from their 
New World, multicultural and Westminster traditions. 
The two have similar positions on trade liberalization. 
Both have long-established economic, security and 
cultural ties with the United States and significant shared 
histories in Asia.
Box 1: Economic Stakes in the Asia-Pacific Region
Three of Canada’s top six export destinations are 
in Northeast Asia, and the economies of ASEAN 
amount to Canada’s seventh largest trading partner. 
East Asian countries and India dominated the list 
of emerging markets targeted by Canada’s Global 
Markets Action Plan, released in November 2013. 
The Government of Canada is conducting free 
trade discussions with India, Japan, Singapore, the 
Republic of Korea and Thailand.
Australia’s economy is already tied to East Asia. 
The Northeast Asian economies of China, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea account for 37 percent 
of Australia’s total trade. Australia’s free trade 
agreement with ASEAN and New Zealand has 
seen Australia’s trade with Southeast Asia rise to 
the country’s second-largest market after China. 
The newly elected coalition government has made 
it clear that economic prerogatives will drive its 
foreign policy toward the region, and will include 
an effort to finalize a trade agreement with China to 
follow from the recently concluded agreement with 
Korea. 
East Asia confronts a number of threats that 
endanger not only the region’s peace and security, 
but also its economic growth, which has received a 
great deal of attention from the business community 
and political leaders in Canada and Australia. The 
two countries must contribute to regional stability 
to secure the “Asian Century” that has captured 
corporate interest.
When addressing the Australian Parliament in 2007, 
Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper referred to the 
two countries as “strategic cousins.” Australian Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott is demonstrably enthusiastic 
about relations with his Canadian counterpart. 
This alignment provides a strategic space for some 
creative and constructive thinking by Canadians and 
Australians about how best to capitalize on each other’s 
complementary interests in East Asia’s economic and 
security domains. The two sides have established 
communications mechanisms via the Canada-Australia 
Public Policy Initiative, their long-standing membership 
in the “Five Eyes” intelligence community and their new 
strategic dialogue (inaugurated in 2011 by then Defence 
Ministers Peter MacKay and Stephen Smith). Both have 
recently subsumed their foreign aid bureaucracies into 
their departments of foreign affairs, which reflects a 
commonality of approach to the conduct of diplomacy.
Canada and Australia have both emphasized aspects 
of their ties to Asia — for Australia, its proximity to the 
region, and for Canada, its significant Asian population 
— and both have a national interest in contributing to 
regional peace and security in a region both identify as 
the driver of their future prosperity.3 Combined with 
their ambitions for closer trade and investment ties 
with Asia, the two countries have a genuine interest in 
contributing to peace and security in the world’s most 
economically vibrant region. Most East Asian states 
appreciate outside efforts to bolster regional peace 
and security. Consequently, Canada and Australia are 
members of a range of regional multilateral forums 
covering both economic and security affairs including 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), where they 
already play constructive and multi-faceted roles. 
However, there is more to be done. Canada and Australia 
need, inter alia, to:
• deepen relations with the region; 
• open new markets for their companies and access 
value chains;
• reduce investment risks by helping to improve 
the local regulatory environment where their 
firms do business and by completing investment 
agreements; and
• contribute to ameliorating regional flashpoints 
via diplomacy, confidence-building initiatives and 
enhanced defence engagement.
East Asia will continue to drive global growth. The 
region accounts for 26 percent of global GDP, 28 percent 
of global trade and a third of the world’s population 
(World Bank 2013; World Trade Organization 2012, 
26 27). Northeast Asia alone accounts for 16 percent of the 
global economy (World Bank 2013). Often overlooked, 
the 10 countries of the ASEAN bloc, comprising over 
3 See, for example, Government of Australia (2013); Baird (2012).
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600  million people, form an integrated economy of 
US$2.3 trillion and boast an average annual growth rate 
of five percent, which trails only China and India over 
the past decade (ASEAN 2012; World Bank 2013). Sitting 
astride the maritime arteries connecting the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans, Southeast Asia, in particular through the 
mechanisms of ASEAN, has become in effect the fulcrum 
of the region. For this reason, engagement with ASEAN 
and its related forums will remain vital.
For Canada, the region is an increasingly important 
target of Canadian trade diversification efforts, 
given the slowdown of traditional Canadian trading 
partners to the south and to the east across the Atlantic, 
notwithstanding the conclusion of the Canada-Europe 
comprehensive economic and trade agreement. From 
the Australian perspective, exports to the region have 
underwritten national economic growth. However, 
these economic opportunities come at a time of rising 
uncertainty, as traditional patterns of cooperation and 
conflict are unsettled by the rise of new powers and the 
re-emergence of old disputes. 
In sum, continued regional stability cannot be taken for 
granted. 
Critically, this changing strategic setting provides 
the impetus for enhanced collaboration to mitigate 
emerging risks. The Australian experience is instructive. 
Australia is far more deeply engaged in the region than 
is Canada, as a result of the recognition that improving 
opportunities for Australian business goes hand in glove 
with a comprehensive and wide-ranging engagement 
strategy with multiple partners that encompasses both 
economics and security. 
If Canada wants to capitalize on the Asian Century, it 
would do well to draw from the Australian experience by:
• contributing to issues that promote economic 
prosperity and the security and stability of the 
region;
• staying committed for the long haul, demonstrating 
that Canada’s renewed interest is not just a passing 
fad but central to Canada’s national interests; and
• committing to more senior government, official and 
private sector face time in a region where face time 
matters.
Box 2: What Does Australia Bring  
to the Table for Canada? 
Australia is well placed to support Canada’s regional 
re-engagement. Australians are more comfortable 
than ever being seen as part of, yet distinct within, 
Asia. In many ways, this is now seen as a positive, 
with many Asian students choosing to study in 
Australia, in part because of proximity and stability, 
but also due to Australia’s greater affinity with 
and knowledge of the region than other Western 
countries. To a certain extent this has also occurred 
in Western Canada, but for it to happen on a national 
level, Canada must undergo a similar, distinct 
process of national debate about the role of Asia in 
the country’s future.
Box 3: What Does Canada Bring  
to the Table for Australia? 
Given Canada’s legitimate concerns and priorities 
elsewhere, Australian policy makers look for more 
practical demonstrations of Canada’s commitment 
to the region. In this context, it is useful to note 
what a Canadian “pivot” contributes to Australia. 
At the regional level, this includes an additional 
like-minded voice at the table on issues important 
to Australia including people smuggling, human 
rights and military transparency. Canada’s role in 
facilitating Australian access to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) is noteworthy, as are the 
two countries’ shared responsibilities in multilateral 
trade negotiations and arrangements for consular 
support in remote parts of the globe, where only one 
or the other has diplomatic representation. Following 
from the creation of a strategic dialogue on defence 
planning inaugurated in 2011, there is considerable 
leverage to be gained for both countries from seeking 
to align their policy priorities to ensure they operate 
in a way that is mutually reinforcing. Canada shares 
Australia’s world view on many trade and security 
issues, which makes it an appropriate partner on 
matters related to the US alliance system, emerging 
powers and regional governance mechanisms. 
STRATEGIC SETTING 
The wider Asia-Pacific region, including the countries of 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Australasia and 
Pacific Ocean-facing North America, is undergoing a 
strategic shift at a time of global and regional uncertainty. 
A number of unsettled disputes over territory are 
becoming more politically prominent because of rising 
nationalist sentiment, which risks the outbreak of conflict 
in the most heavily armed region in the world. Even 
short of hostilities, these disputes increase investment 
risk and insurance premiums, and reduce opportunities 
for Canadian and Australian companies. 
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The region also confronts a number of non-state threats 
to economic growth including climate change and 
natural disasters, people smuggling, growing demands 
for energy supplies and cyber threats. Importantly, these 
threats occur in areas where Australian and Canadian 
comparative advantages could serve as a basis for deeper 
regional engagement.
THE RISE OF CHINA
Chinese defence spending has been steadily increasing 
at double-digit rates since 1989, fuelled by its impressive 
economic reforms. Although it claims this spending is 
defensive in orientation, China seeks a military with a 
global reach to secure trade routes, protect its citizens 
abroad and maintain its growing investments overseas. 
China will continue to develop its blue-water naval 
and air support capabilities in its future procurement 
plans. The country has deployed a maritime task group 
for anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, which 
demonstrates its ability to sustain forces far from its 
traditional theatre of operations. These steps indicate 
that China seeks a greater role for its armed forces both 
in the region and beyond. 
In addition to its more potent military, Beijing is prepared 
to resist perceived slights on issues that affect the rule 
of the CCP. Years of emphasizing China’s “peaceful 
rise” in the region have given way to a confidence since 
2009 that makes China more willing to use its economic 
weight and military and paramilitary power to assert 
its interests. Methods include, but are not limited to, 
deploying its coast guard vessels to police its claimed 
but disputed maritime jurisdiction, applying informal 
economic sanctions, encouraging consumer boycotts 
and, in November 2013, declaring an Air Defence 
Identification Zone in the East China Sea. 
This behaviour has unsettled the neighbourhood, and 
points to the need for closer Canadian and Australian 
engagement with China as well as engagement with 
other security partners across East Asia.
Figure 1: Real Military Expenditures in Selected Asian Countries (Inflation-adjusted Index, 1988 = 100)
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THE CHALLENGE TO US STRATEGIC POWER 
IN ASIA
Overwhelming US military strength has deterred 
military adventurism by would-be aggressors in the 
region since the end of World War II. However, amid 
some calls in Washington for the United States to “come 
home,” the United States is indebted and war weary. 
Mandatory budget cuts will constrain a US military that 
fought two wars in the Middle East for over a decade. 
Some strategists believe that China’s strategic shift since 
2009 is based on the expectation that the United States 
does not have the capacity, or perhaps the political will, 
to stay a steady course in Asia. 
China’s behaviour has increased quiet demands from 
countries in the region that the United States remain a 
dominant military power in East Asia. To allay regional 
unease, US President Barack Obama has reasserted the 
US commitment to regional security. In his address to the 
Australian Parliament in November 2011, Obama stated 
unequivocally that “reductions in US defence spending 
will not — I repeat, will not — come at the expense of 
the Asia Pacific.” This “rebalancing” from the Middle 
East and Europe is more than just a military effort — it is 
recognition that the United States’ economic future is tied 
to Asia. US leaders are quick to emphasize the economic 
dimensions of the rebalancing, embodied by the trade 
negotiations toward a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
as well as the political and humanitarian aspects.
As a result, the United States is seeking to revitalize 
ties with its allies and, for the first time, encouraged 
Australia, the Republic of Korea and Japan to cooperate 
to strengthen regional security. The United States has 
also sought to engage Australia and Canada more 
closely in its security arrangements centred on the US 
military’s Pacific Command in Hawaii. As US allies with 
an interest in regional stability and free access to the 
global commons, deeper cooperation with the United 
States makes sense for Canada and Australia.
The two countries have responded positively to these US 
overtures. Canada and the United States have instituted 
an annual strategic dialogue on security issues in the 
region. Australia has assigned ships to work intimately 
with the US 7th Fleet based in Japan, and Canada seems 
prepared to increase the visibility of its navy in the 
region. In addition, Canada and Australia have assigned 
officials to operate in senior embedded positions in 
the US hierarchy in Hawaii, where they contribute 
alternative perspectives that reflect Australian and 
Canadian values and interests. These interventions 
are largely well received in the region and helpful 
in enabling the United States to engage in the region 
without unduly exacerbating tensions. There is a need to 
ensure the “rebalancing” does not increase Chinese fears 
about containment.
Box 4: Sources of Instability in East Asia
East Asia has gone from being particularly 
violent in the 30 years that followed the end of 
World War II to being particularly peaceful following 
the end of Cambodia’s civil war in 1991. There are, 
however, new or re-emerging sources of tension 
and instability accompanying the region’s explosive 
economic growth:
• The addition of one billion people to the 
middle class over the next five to 10 years will 
present enormous challenges and opportunities. 
Asia’s new middle class can be expected to 
demand participation in political systems where 
institutionalized avenues for political participation 
are weak.
• A shifting regional balance of power where a 
group of rising new regional powers — including 
India, Indonesia, Vietnam and South Korea — are 
challenging the regional power hierarchy, and 
where Russia and Japan worry about their loss of 
power relative to China.
• China’s heavy-handed management of relations 
with its smaller neighbours, particularly over 
maritime and other territorial disputes, drives 
them into the arms of the United States.
• Increased competition over scarce offshore energy 
and fisheries resources, localized in disputed 
maritime areas. 
• Rising nationalism is playing out in territorial and 
resource disputes in the region. These disputes 
are infused by deep-rooted cultural and historical 
animosities tied to the legitimacy of political elites.
• Incidents at sea risk heightened escalation 
involving the naval vessels, coast guards and other 
maritime entities of claimant states.
• North Korea’s continuing nuclear sabre-rattling 
and blackmail tactics threaten security on the 
Korean peninsula.
• A major modernization of armed forces in the 
region, bordering on an arms race. 
• Monopolization of water flows by China has 
become a source of leverage over downstream 
states in the Mekong River delta.
• Radicalization of ethnic and religious minorities has 
occurred, in particular in western China, southern 
Philippines, Myanmar’s borderlands, southern 
Thailand and parts of Malaysia and Indonesia. 
This leaves many states distrustful of each other, 
internally focussed and constrained from thinking 
strategically and acting collectively.
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From Australia’s perspective, these arrangements reflect 
a bipartisan commitment to encourage the United States 
to maintain an active and constructive role in ensuring 
regional security and stability while also providing an 
important means for engagement with the United States 
on issues of concern to Australia. For Canada, the issue 
may not be as fully articulated, but the sentiment is the 
same. Beyond these measures, there remains scope for 
considerably more to be explored on a bilateral basis 
between these two close US allies.
MARITIME SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL 
DISPUTES
Territorial and maritime boundary disputes have caused 
several states to increase spending on naval capabilities. 
Regional states are preoccupied with the potential riches 
from exploiting the oil, gas, minerals and fisheries that 
lie in disputed offshore areas. The political importance 
of nationalism has hardened state postures and thwarted 
cooperation. There have been a number of confrontations 
at sea between claimant states. In this context, there is a 
growing demand for US power in the region as a direct 
consequence of China’s perceived aggression in regional 
maritime disputes, despite the pursuit of assertive 
policies by all sides. 
The prospect of conflict at sea raises the cost of shipping 
through the world’s busiest sea lanes. Furthermore, 
the recent tit-for-tat encroachment of coastal states 
on international airspace raises further concerns. 
First, it creates uncertainties for civilian air traffic in 
overlapping areas. Second, it will likely increase the 
number of interceptions between military aircraft, which 
have proven dangerous, and even fatal in April 2001. 
Threats to the global commons will ensure international 
preoccupation with regional security in East Asia.
Australia and Canada can play a role in encouraging 
the states involved to look beyond their own nationalist 
agendas. Although neither Australia nor Canada has a 
direct stake in these disputes, they are well placed to foster 
confidence-building measures and enhance regional 
collaboration and the de-escalation of disputes. Both 
countries have made important contributions to regional 
institutions in the past, including in the formation of 
APEC and support for track two diplomacy in the South 
China Sea.
Simultaneously, threats to maritime security (beyond 
the escalation of the region’s maritime disputes) include 
piracy, high seas robbery, the politically motivated 
disruption of sea lanes and people-smuggling cartels 
dominating irregular and unregulated movement of 
people at sea, and bind East Asian states together. The 
stakes are high. The sea lanes of communication are 
the arteries of the region’s growth, and the logistics of 
energy security feed the region’s prosperity. Fifty percent 
of global container traffic passes through the Indian 
Ocean and Pacific sea lanes, as does 70 percent of ship-
borne energy (Locklear 2012). Southeast Asian states 
have been particularly receptive to capacity-building 
efforts, including coast guard exchanges, from China, 
Japan and Korea in the past. As countries that also police 
large maritime areas with scarce resources and that have 
refined and mature capabilities to offer, Canada and 
Australia could make headway in this area. 
Engagement in regional security issues, in particular 
through the range of economic and security-related 
forums, improves relations with countries in the 
region, reduces the investment risks for Canadian and 
Australian companies and builds the trust needed to 
open new markets in the region. The Royal Australian 
Navy and Royal Canadian Navy already collaborate 
extensively on these issues in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf 
of Aden and elsewhere.
EMERGING “NON-TRADITIONAL” SECURITY 
THREATS 
In addition to these state-centric challenges, a number 
of security threats are emerging that are reshaping 
regional dynamics. Food, energy, environment and cyber 
insecurity threaten economic growth and undermine 
political systems in the region.
Price spikes in global food prices after 2008, driven by 
higher input prices including petrochemicals, and the 
growing frequency of extreme weather events in fertile 
areas have exacerbated food insecurities. Increased 
urbanization has reduced the availability of arable 
land, which has further affected food insecurity. The 
region presents a tremendous market opportunity for 
Australian and Canadian agricultural producers, who 
are net exporters of agricultural goods.
The Asia-Pacific region, particularly Northeast Asia, 
suffers from an acute sense of energy insecurity. The 
region consumes 34 percent of global energy, yet 
possesses less than three percent of global oil reserves 
and around five percent of global gas reserves (BP plc 
2013). The situation is worsened by hoarding practices 
by some states and by market interference by states 
using their revenue to “secure” energy sources overseas.
Feeding this appetite for energy and commodities 
has underwritten Australia’s economic boom over 
the past decade. Canadian political and business 
leaders recognize that the time has come for them to 
capitalize on this market as well. As resource exporters, 
Canada and Australia are well placed to engage 
regional partners in a comprehensive framework 
on energy security that strengthens management 
of supplies and mitigates supply disruptions. 
Natural disasters and climate change present a 
recurrent and growing threat to economic stability 
in the region, exacerbated by poor adaptive capacity 
on the part of regional states and institutions. 
This is well demonstrated by Typhoon Haiyan/
Yolanda, which struck the Philippines in November 
2013. In the long term, rising sea levels and other 
environmental pressures will exacerbate many of the 
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Figure 2: Sea Lanes and Maritime Disputes in East Asia
Indian Ocean Sea Lines of Communication
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food and energy insecurities noted above. Admiral 
Samuel Locklear, commander of US Pacific Command, 
recently described climate-related disruptions as the 
most probable security challenge in the Asia-Pacific 
(Bender 2013). The Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre has reported that around 117 million people were 
displaced by natural disasters and climate-related events 
from 2008 to 2012, across all of Asia (Yonetani 2013, 27).
Australia and Canada have significant experience and 
the resources and capabilities to address these matters. 
Both countries made considerable diplomatic headway 
in the region after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and 
with similar responses to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda. 
There is the potential for both Canada and Australia 
to make significant and constructive contributions 
to regional security and stability in the face of a 
likely surge in such challenges. At a minimum, the 
increase of climate refugees suggests the escalation of 
existing concerns for both governments, warranting 
closer bilateral consultation and collaboration.
The emerging issue of cyber security also presents a 
challenge to regional security. Numerous studies place 
East Asia as the leading point of origin (by IP address) 
for cyber attacks. Canada and Australia already share 
a high standard of cyber security capabilities. Canada 
and Australia could work with countries in the region 
to strengthen global institutions and norms surrounding 
the use of cyber capabilities. 
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 Figure 3: Global Origin of Cyber Attacks 
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In sum, East Asia confronts a number of growing threats 
to its prosperity; however, these same circumstances 
also provide an opportunity for Canada and Australia to 
contribute to the reduction of such risks. 
Canada could take its cue from the Australian experience, 
which is predicated on committing the time of senior 
political leaders, officials, the business community 
and real resources to deepening bilateral relations and 
multilateral engagement. Working jointly with ASEAN 
on non-traditional security concerns is a very promising 
path forward.
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
Asian countries prefer consensus building over 
negotiation and rules, and have developed the evolving 
institutions for confidence building in security and 
economic integration along those lines. As a result, the 
functional contribution they make to regional stability 
is generally marginal, although some progress is being 
made in harnessing the region’s remarkable diversity and 
competing interests around common goals. In practice, 
these regional institutions facilitate interaction between 
competing interests in a constructive setting, where 
personal relationships facilitate mutual understanding. 
Participation by non-Asian countries is noted and 
appreciated. 
Participants at recent meetings, however, have struggled 
to develop a coherent response towards competing 
sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. ASEAN 
countries are divided between those that claim part of 
the South China Sea and those that do not. The latter 
group includes countries dependent on Chinese aid 
and investment. Those that are most alarmed have 
sought deeper US involvement in the region, inviting 
the US to “rebalance.” The related dilemma is that most 
governments recognize that their economic future is tied 
to China, but seek out the Americans to provide security. 
In this climate, Northeast Asian rivalries are being 
played out in Southeast Asia as Japan improves its ties 
with countries alienated by China.
Australia has remained consistently engaged in the 
region and is well placed to participate in these forums. 
Canada has a strong track record of engagement, but its 
investment in the process is not perceived as consistent 
and strong. For that perception to change, Canada needs 
to demonstrate its resolve to remain engaged as a serious 
player in regional security, including in the range of 
multilateral official and semi-official forums to pave the 
way for deeper participation. Renewed engagement can 
be pursued at the official and unofficial levels through 
participation in the ARF and its associated think tank, 
the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. 
Building closer bilateral defence relationships, in 
addition to broader engagement with ASEAN, is a critical 
preliminary step for Canada as it seeks membership in 
the premier regional economic and security institutions: 
the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) respectively.
Predisposed to a trans-Atlantic tradition, and 
often preoccupied by Middle Eastern and African 
engagements, Canada has not been seen as a consistent 
and committed participant in these ASEAN-centric 
forums. To change these regional perceptions of Canada, 
considerable investments in time and effort, especially 
at the bilateral level, are required to deepen bilateral 
defence and security ties with key trade and investment 
partners in the region.
Asian countries have come to value the notion of 
multilateral defence diplomacy — the idea that military 
exchanges and exercises can increase transparency and 
reduce suspicion among potential adversaries. In many 
respects, this is based on the recognition that defence 
diplomacy is needed to maintain and strengthen ASEAN. 
 
SPECIAL REPORT
 • 9
This also provides a number of openings for Canada 
and Australia, separately or together, to engage with 
regional security partners in ways that were difficult to 
conceive only a few years ago, specifically the biannual 
humanitarian and disaster relief exercise held under the 
auspices of the ARF, and increasingly under the auspices 
of the ADMM-Plus. Canada should consider engaging 
the priority markets outlined in its Global Markets Action 
Plan (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Korea, Thailand and Vietnam) as security and economic 
partners.
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
The region’s economic dynamism in the post-war period 
has been underpinned by US defence alliances, most 
notably with Japan, which have kept China and Japan 
from each other’s throats and provided a foundation of 
political stability, leaving governments relatively free 
to focus on economic development and integration. 
Millions of people are now approaching middle-class 
levels of per capita incomes. Governments have become 
concerned about avoiding the “middle-income trap,” in 
which increases in per capita income could slow or even 
stagnate. At the same time, individual expectations of 
material prosperity are rising because of a reluctance to 
make changes to institutions and incentive systems that 
encourage technical change and innovation as a source 
of growth. Regional production networks that foster 
the division of labour among countries and provide 
opportunities for moving up the value chain and greater 
engagement in trade in parts and components linked 
to cross-border investment assist with the desired 
transition. Facilitating the growth of global value chains 
is one of the main focusses of the TPP negotiations. 
The TPP originated in a smaller agreement that others 
could apply to join — which the United States did. It now 
includes 12 countries on both sides of the Pacific, and is 
designed to address twenty-first century trade challenges 
such as global value chains, state-owned enterprises, 
competition policy, investment and intellectual property 
concerns. More recently, ASEAN has proposed the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
Figure 4: Index of Rice Prices, Selected Asian Economies (February 2009 Price = 100)
 
50	
  
75	
  
100	
  
125	
  
150	
  
175	
  
200	
  
225	
  
Index	
  of	
  Rice	
  Prices,	
  Selected	
  Asian	
  Economies	
  
February	
  2009	
  Price	
  =	
  100	
  
China,	
  Average	
  Retail	
  Price	
  in	
  50	
  Main	
  Ci8es,	
  Japonica	
  Rice	
   Indonesia,	
  Na8onal	
  Average	
  Retail	
  Price	
  
Myanmar,	
  Na8onal	
  Average	
  Retail	
  Price,	
  Emata	
  Rice	
   Philippines,	
  Na8onal	
  Average	
  Retail	
  Price	
  
Viet	
  Nam,	
  An	
  Giang	
  Province,	
  Average	
  Wholesale	
  Price	
   Thailand,	
  Interna8onal	
  Export	
  Price,	
  Fragrant	
  Rice	
  
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.
 
FACING WEST, FACING NORTH: CANADA AND AUSTRALIA IN EAST ASIA
10 • WWW.ASPI.ORG.AU | WWW.CIGIONLINE.ORG
 Figure 5: Asia’s Regional Security Architecture — Where Australia and Canada Fit 
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in an effort to consolidate a series of plurilateral trade 
agreements between ASEAN and China, India, Japan 
and Korea, as well as New Zealand and Australia.
These initiatives create competing pressures for those 
on the outside. Consistent with ASEAN’s style, the 
RCEP is preoccupied with traditional concerns of trade 
in finished goods and is moving more slowly than the 
TPP. Although the RCEP currently excludes the United 
States and Canada, the TPP has proven itself to be a more 
flexible model, capable of incorporating latecomers 
like Canada, Mexico and Japan. China is studying the 
question.
With shared equity in maintaining a rules-based 
economic order, and with their own access to the US 
market at risk, Canada and Australia have a vested 
interest in facilitating a constructive path forward, up to 
and including supporting Chinese accession to the TPP in 
the same spirit as encouraging its accession to the World 
Trade Organization almost a generation ago. Economic 
and security cooperation go hand in hand. Economic 
integration can leaven tensions; security cooperation and 
institutional face time can build trade ties by maintaining 
stability, reducing mistrust and preventing potentially 
costly escalation of regional disputes.
AUSTRALIA’S OUTLOOK  
ON EAST ASIA
For obvious geostrategic reasons, Southeast Asia looms 
large in Australia’s security consciousness. This has 
traditionally driven Australians to seek security ties 
with great powers, first the United Kingdom and then 
the United States. Australia was a founding member 
of the ADMM-Plus initiative because Australia has 
consistently invested in Southeast Asian relations over 
several decades. 
Australia engaged in a vigorous debate for much of the 
1980s and 1990s about where its strategic prerogatives 
should lie — with historical partners such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States, or with East Asia. 
In practice, Australian policy has emphasized deep 
engagement both with Asia and with traditional friends 
and allies. Early trade and economic engagement with 
Japan after World War II created the basis for solid 
Australian economic growth in the 1960s. China’s 
economic opening in the 1980s and the broader North 
Asian demand for Australian commodities continues 
to be the basis of Australian economic growth. In 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Australia has sought to 
develop strong economic, defence and people-to-people
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Figure 6: The Pacific Rim
Source: Blaxland (2006).
ties for decades. Although there have been incidences of 
mutual mistrust and occasional misunderstandings, the 
trend over the last half century has been for a deepening 
of relations between Australia and the Asia-Pacific even 
as the United States has remained Australia’s closest 
defence partner through the ANZUS alliance4 as well as 
its largest economic partner through a combination of 
trade and investment.
Australia’s engagement with ASEAN neighbours as 
partners has paid real dividends for its standing as a 
major contributor to the region’s security and economic 
prosperity. Like many of its neighbours, Australia 
looks for practical signs of Canada’s bid for regional 
re-engagement. Furthermore, Australia shares broader 
regional hesitations about the durability of Canada’s 
re-engagement with the region, which it sees as being 
driven largely by economic motivations. Ottawa needs 
to understand that engagement comes at the price 
of being involved in the region on a practical level. 
Defence cooperation requires Canadian Armed Forces 
(CAF) assets to visit the region and engage in practical 
exercises and skill development. Not surprisingly, being 
engaged requires Canada to actually be in the region. 
Over time, a real priority for engagement must drive 
defence cooperation investment decisions. Australians 
4 ANZUS is a military alliance between the United States, Australia 
and New Zealand.
are ready to welcome heightened Canadian participation 
in regional affairs. Australia and Canada should work 
together where they can add value, and separately where 
it makes sense to do so.
CANADA’S OUTLOOK  
ON EAST ASIA
Given its geography, Canada has primarily focussed 
south across the 49th parallel to the United States and 
looked east across the Atlantic to the United Kingdom; 
however, it has had important but little-recognized 
security and trade interests in East Asia. These enduring 
interests are defined by several considerations, 
including Canada’s growing diversification of trading 
and investment partners and the associated necessity of 
strengthening regional security and institutions. Almost 
10 percent of Canadians identify as being of South Asian 
or Chinese heritage; Asia is the largest regional source 
of immigration to Canada (Statistics Canada 2013, 7 
and 15).
Although it is hamstrung by limited budgets, if Canada is 
to make the most out of Asian growth, its stake in regional 
stability and prosperity must grow commensurately. 
Canada’s economic partners in the region, notably Japan 
and Korea, but also new trading partners in Southeast 
Asia, have signalled that if Canada wants to conclude 
new investment and trade deals, it will have to be a 
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more reliable and engaged security partner. Although 
China, the region’s biggest economic player, has not 
sought increased security engagement from Canada, 
it may be responsive to such overtures if they are 
presented appropriately. As a globally conscious country 
of capacity, Canada can work with other “constructive 
powers” to influence the behaviour of great powers in 
the region.
Like Australia, Canada also has a clear interest in the 
prudent management of relations between the United 
States and China. Ottawa is well placed to act as a 
secondary conduit between Washington and East Asia. 
Many of the region’s emerging security challenges, 
including cyber security, are global challenges that 
require a concerted regional and global response. 
Canada can make substantial contributions, but will 
have greater impact if it works with a like-minded 
country such as Australia. Other security challenges, 
such as food and energy security, provide opportunities 
for Canadian business, which could significantly bolster 
Canada’s prospects for engagement in the region on 
other fronts.
PROPOSALS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
There is the potential for significant synergies to be 
harnessed between Canada and Australia at diplomatic, 
strategic and economic levels. A clear demonstration 
of resolve and political will, informed by a fresh 
understanding of what they have in common, is needed. 
The political alignment between the Harper and 
Abbott governments can help to broaden and deepen 
bilateral relations in terms of immediate opportunities 
for cooperation. It is important to recognize, though, 
that there is strong bipartisan political support for the 
relationship and, with the right emphasis, it should thrive 
under any combination of governments in Canberra and 
Ottawa.
Australian and Canadian political leaders, policy makers 
and business people must focus on areas where they can 
make tangible and mutually beneficial steps towards 
closer bilateral engagement. Close cooperation already 
exists, but it should be ramped up. There is scope for 
enhanced engagement across the following four areas: 
strengthening regional security; bolstering regional 
governance mechanisms; enhancing bilateral defence 
and security cooperation; and boosting industrial and 
economic cooperation.
STRENGTHENING REGIONAL SECURITY
• Australia and Canada should take practical steps 
to help build trust and reduce the potential 
for misperceptions and crises in the region. As 
respected and influential countries with high-
quality defence forces, Australia and Canada 
are welcomed in East Asia as net contributors to 
stability.
o Align and deepen defence engagement with 
China. Canada and Australia can help to 
integrate China more fully into the regional 
security architecture by extending invitations 
to observe and, where possible, participate 
in programmed international security events 
including civil-military disaster response and 
counterterrorism exercises.
o Strengthen defence ties with other regional 
powers, including India, Japan, Korea and 
Indonesia. Canada and Australia should 
provide information exchanges on how 
relations with the great powers are being 
managed and develop confidence-building 
measures bilaterally and multilaterally.
o Facilitate track one and track two information 
exchanges. Canada and Australia could jointly 
host such events and, at minimum, should have 
each other closely in mind when formulating 
proposals and information exchanges. The 
defence attaché in both capitals should be 
upgraded.
• Share policy approaches on people smuggling. 
Canada and Australia can benefit from continuing 
to work together operationally while harmonizing 
their positions toward transit countries and aligning 
their messages to key states (notably Indonesia, but 
also Malaysia, Thailand and Sri Lanka). Australia’s 
new head of Operation Sovereign Borders could 
help take the lead on this.
o Enhance law enforcement collaboration and 
information sharing. Information sharing is 
required between the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) and Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) as well as state/provincial and 
municipal police bodies on transnational crime. 
This would involve reaching beyond federal 
bodies to their state/provincial counterparts to 
explore opportunities together. The initiative 
would require the RCMP and AFP to work 
in collaboration, but modern information 
communications technology makes this quite 
feasible.
BOLSTERING REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS
• Support capacity building in East Asia. Canada 
and Australia are well placed to leverage their 
expertise in a range of areas to build the capacity 
of their partners in the region. This could include 
areas such as peace operations, military medicine, 
strengthening regional military approaches toward 
the rule of law, strengthening counterterrorism 
collaboration and reviewing options for a common 
agenda on food security.
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• Develop shared approaches to humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief. Canada and 
Australia should participate in preparatory training 
that draws on ADF and CAF elements as they 
undertake military exercises. 
• Share approaches to building cyber resilience. 
Australia and Canada should consider ways to 
bolster regional cyber security capabilities that 
include assisting local authorities build cyber 
resilience in Southeast Asia.
• Strengthen the ARF. Canada and Australia 
should consider aligning working group agendas 
with other institutions like the ADMM-Plus, for 
example, on maritime security. The two countries 
should foster collegial engagement on topics of 
mutual concern, perhaps under the auspices of the 
Expert and Eminent Persons group under the ARF. 
• Engage South Asian regional institutions. The 
Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Asian Coast 
Guard Forum are two examples. 
• Cooperate in development assistance 
programming in countries of comparable levels 
of engagement, including Mongolia and Vietnam, 
and countries of priority such as Myanmar. This 
builds stronger economies and better governance, 
which strengthens the climate for Australian and 
Canadian business.
ENHANCING BILATERAL DEFENCE 
COOPERATION
Building on their strong intelligence-sharing relationship, 
Canada and Australia should consider a range of strategic 
and governance proposals that draw on ADF and CAF 
resources. The Australian Defence Organisation and 
Canada’s Department of National Defence, and related 
services, should seek to:
• Align interaction with Chinese security forces. 
Canada and Australia should develop common 
standards/protocols on interaction with the 
Chinese military and security forces, including the 
newly formed China Coast Guard.
• Share lessons learned on regional defence 
engagement. Australia has considerably greater 
levels of engagement in the region, but Canada has 
a wealth of experience from its engagement in other 
parts of the globe, which is acknowledged by its 
regional partners. Lessons can be shared through 
working-level information exchanges as well as 
regular high-level meetings.
• Promote even closer cyber cooperation. Much 
work is needed to ensure that the CAF and the 
ADF remain interoperable while also maintaining 
the highest levels of cyber defence. The Australian 
Signals Directorate and Communications Security 
Establishment Canada are already involved in this 
domain, but further collaborative measures should 
be explored, including in military-to-military 
cooperation.
• Maximize opportunities presented by multilateral 
exercises. Exercises such as RIMPAC (the Rim of 
the Pacific exercise) and Cobra Gold are excellent 
venues for collaboration and building ties with 
regional security partners. Canada and Australia 
already participate in RIMPAC; however, neither 
has a significant presence at Cobra Gold, which 
is the most significant regional military exercise 
conducted in Southeast Asia. They should also 
use the exercise to explore further opportunities 
for bilateral and multilateral collaboration with 
like-minded regional security partners, such as 
FRANZ.5Australia is a major participant in the 
Five Power Defence Arrangements with Singapore, 
the United Kingdom, Malaysia and New Zealand. 
Canada conceivably could seek observer status 
in such activities and coordinate the timing of 
participation in other regional activities (such 
as Cobra Gold) to be closely aligned, enabling 
sequential participation. Similarly, Canada could 
widen the list of countries that it invites to the 
annual Maple Flag exercise. 
• Deepen bilateral military dialogues. Australian 
and Canadian officials should meet regularly to 
identify opportunities in defence diplomacy, both 
under the nascent ADMM-Plus construct and 
under NATO.
• Share best practices on defence reform. Both 
Australian and Canadian defence establishments 
are going through new reform programs designed 
to make efficiencies and maximize value for money. 
The comparable size, scale and organizational 
structure of the two countries’ defence organizations 
provide opportunities to share best practice 
thinking on defence reform.
BOOSTING DEFENCE INDUSTRY AND 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION
• Develop synergies in military procurement. There 
are a number of potential synergies on procurement 
priorities between the two countries. The Harper 
government’s new Global Markets Action Plan 
(November 2013) calls for greater attention to the 
defence sector. For instance: 
o The industrial capacity required to meet 
Canada’s Arctic and maritime security priorities 
is similar to that required for Australia’s interest 
in acoustic technologies and systems.
o The two countries share procurement goals in 
soldier protection and outfitting.
5 FRANZ is a military agreement between France, Australia and 
New Zealand.
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o Both countries need to replace their submarine 
fleets, yet neither Canada nor Australia has the 
critical mass to sustain its maritime defence 
industry single-handedly. Long-term industrial 
cooperation could see a longer production 
run and yield more benefits to industry. 
Canada could purchase next-generation diesel 
submarines made in Australia. 
o As a quid pro quo, Australia could review 
options for collaboration in the Offshore Patrol 
Vessel program that will be built in Canada, as 
Australia looks to build its capacity for offshore 
patrolling the Southern Ocean.
o Reviews in both countries highlight the need 
to engage industry earlier in the procurement 
process. Given the lack of critical mass in either 
country to maintain rolling production lines 
for capital items like ships, defence companies 
in both countries should consider discussing 
the procurement needs of their government 
and look to present their governments with 
cost-saving opportunities for cooperation 
between Canada and Australia. Cooperative 
procurement could generate savings for both 
countries.
• Align agendas as agriculture exporters. Canada 
should follow the Australian lead and remove tariff 
barriers from agriculture. Free trade in agriculture 
is the best way to improve food security.
• Cooperate to act as secure suppliers of energy. 
Canada should consider extending to its Asian 
trade partners guarantees similar to those 
contained in Article Six of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement as relates to the export of energy. 
Australia should consider extending similar 
guarantees.
STRENGTHENING BILATERAL 
DEFENCE AND SECURITY 
RELATIONS: NEXT STEPS
This agenda for closer Australia-Canada defence 
and security cooperation builds on an already close 
relationship, albeit one that suffers occasionally from 
complacency, given the levels of comfort between the 
two countries, and a perception that distance makes 
cooperation difficult.
The good news is that the defence and military 
relationship is already well supported by a number of 
key annual meetings. As outlined by Australia’s then 
Defence Minister Stephen Smith in September 2011: “We 
have agreed that from here on in we will have formal 
Australia-Canada Ministerial Bilateral Meetings on an 
annual basis. We will also have meetings of our Chiefs 
of Defence Forces on an annual basis and meetings of 
our defence officials at Deputy Secretary level also on an 
annual basis” (Minister for Defence 2011). 
These three sets of senior meetings provide the right 
mechanism to drive the bilateral defence relationship.
Relations between foreign ministries, intelligence 
agencies, police, customs and immigration departments 
are vital to the broader security relationship, both at the 
strategic level and in specific functional areas. These 
relations, both at ministerial and official levels, should 
be intensified in a manner that complements the defence 
component. The recommendations in this report provide 
a suitable checklist for ministers and senior officials to 
benchmark progress in relations.
It should be noted, of course, that a closer and more active 
bilateral security and defence relationship and a more 
coordinated approach to East Asian engagement cannot 
be achieved without some cost. Expressed priorities 
must drive some investment decisions. While the cost of 
sustaining a more active bilateral relationship may not 
be that great, a bigger investment must come in the form 
of the time ministers and senior officials should devote 
to the relationship. The payoff from closer cooperation 
between Canada and Australia, two countries that pride 
themselves on their capacity for innovation and for 
practical achievements, could be enormous.
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